The Elections of February 1936

This map shows the results of the February 1936 elections, which the Popular Front won by a narrow margin. The provinces in blue were won by the right, those in brown by the left, and those in green by the centre.

The failure of the right-wing bloc was interpreted as the end of the possibilist path championed by the CEDA. Until then, the coalition of parties led by José María Gil Robles had sought to reform the system from within. Since its founding on 5 March 1933, the conservative and clerical organization had followed a gradualist strategy aimed at steadily expanding its influence until it could take power. Electoral victory would culminate this process by allowing them to lead the government and thus drive constitutional reform, something that would become possible as of December 1936, after the constitution had been in effect for five years. Optimistic, they launched an aggressive campaign with slogans such as “Let’s go for the three hundred [seats]!” and “All power to the Leader.”

Electoral defeat thwarted the plan and, with it, the CEDA's chances of leading a right wing that was increasingly viewing military intervention as the only solution. Gil Robles himself also adopted this position. As Manuel Giménez Fernández, representative of the more centrist wing of the CEDA, recalled, the CEDA leader had made it clear to him and his colleague Luis Lucia in May 1936 that the creation of a national government or any other democratic solution was no longer viable.

Aware that a military action was the only solution that would benefit him, Gil Robles made the personal decision to support it. He did so through three means. From the floor of Congress, he undermined the government with incendiary speeches aimed at fostering the sense that a coup was necessary to restore social peace. He financed the conspiracy by sending Mola five hundred thousand pesetas from his party's electoral funds. And he carried out smaller tasks, such as taking part in the arrangements to secure a plane to fly Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco or drafting a manifesto in Biarritz on 16 July justifying the coup.

Although he did this on his own account, as leader of the CEDA Gil Robles prepared confidential instructions instructing the members of his party what to do when the uprising occurred. He urged them to give immediate public support to the military, to collaborate without displaying a partisan attitude, to enlist in the Army rather than in militias or their own battalions, to refrain from reprisals against leftist elements—who would be judged in military courts with legal guarantees—to avoid power struggles over political dominance, and to provide financial support to the rebellion. These instructions were sent to provincial leaders and were well received by the majority of party members, who, like nearly all the main leaders, supported the uprising. However, there were also exceptions, among the top ranks, such as Manuel Giménez Fernández and Luis Lucia, as well as grassroots members and the party’s middle ranks.

PMC